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The Public Defender Crisis in America: 
Gideon, the War on Drugs and the Fight for 
Equality 
William Lawrence
*
 
“No one should have to buy justice in a land that boasts that justice 
is free.” 
-Clara Foltz, 1897 
1
 
The role of the public defender in the United States is one that is 
often disparaged and widely misunderstood. This note will first 
attempt to illuminate the evolution of the public defender 
movement in the United States, detailing its rather quiet ascent 
to the forefront of the criminal justice system: from the early 
work of Clara Foltz, to the trial of Clarence Earl Gideon, and 
beyond. The note will also broach just a few of the many 
systemic issues faced by the modern day public defender, 
including the unfortunate perception of inferiority from both the 
general public and indigent defendants alike. This perception is 
further accentuated by the vast disparity in resources between 
the American public defender and the American prosecutor. This 
resource disparity is due to a plethora of internal and external 
forces, including the devastating effect of the United States’ War 
on Drugs. While the creation of certain diversionary programs 
like drug treatment courts have helped to ameliorate some stress 
on public defender workloads, it is not a sustainable solution to 
the existing problems. The note concludes with a comparative 
                                                                                                             
 *  William D. Lawrence, Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Miami School of Law, 
2015. I would like to thank Professor Jessi Tamayo of the University of Miami School of 
Law faculty for her guidance and encouragement throughout the writing of this note. I 
would also like to thank fellow Juris Doctor Candidate, Alyssa Wohl, for her input and 
assistance during the editing process. 
1 Stanford University Women’s Legal History, Women Lawyer: The Trials of Clara 
Foltz, http://wlh.law.stanford.edu/woman-lawyer. 
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analysis to the United Kingdom, and several posited solutions to 
the public defender crisis in the United States.  
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I. THE INFANCY OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER MOVEMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Contrary to what has become widespread public opinion, the roots of 
the public defender’s office, and more specifically the right to counsel in 
the United States, began long before the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gideon v. Wainwright.
2
 In fact, one need not look further than the plain 
text of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified in 
1791, in order to recognize that the guarantee of the assistance of counsel 
in criminal prosecutions is a right that strikes at the very foundation of 
our country’s constitutional jurisprudence.3 
After the passage of the Sixth Amendment the states, too, began 
embodying this same principle in their own interpretation of the federal 
constitution. For example, in 1853, the Indiana Supreme Court in Webb 
v. Baird recognized the importance of attorney assistance in criminal 
prosecutions, particularly when the defendant was indigent.
4
 
Nevertheless, the legal theory of the guarantee of counsel has only 
slowly and haltingly made its way to the forefront of our justice system. 
                                                                                                             
2 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 336 (1962). 
3 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
4 Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854), distinguished by Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 
(1942). 
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The work of Clara Foltz, a lawyer and political activist in the late 
1890s, was especially significant to the fledgling indigent advocacy 
movement in the United States.
5
 Foltz, who was the first female lawyer 
barred in the state of California, advocated zealously for the creation of a 
public defender’s office: a concept which was as novel as it was 
controversial in the late 1890s—even in the more progressive political 
climate of the Pacific Northwest.
6
 Foltz was an integral player in the 
creation of the modern public defender system.
7
 Foltz first formally 
introduced her newly discovered theories on August 12
th
, 1893 at the 
World’s Fair in Chicago, Illinois.8 In addition, she also presented a 
proposal, entitled the ―The Foltz Public Defender Bill,‖ which outlined 
the logistical hurdles associated with effective indigent defense that 
would be overcome under her plan.
9
 
Foltz’s bill would devote an entire budgetary arm of a state, city, or 
municipality to employing full-time, salaried lawyers who would work, 
often exclusively, on the specialized needs of indigent criminal 
defendants.
10
 Such a proposal would radically change the status quo at 
the time, which was essentially an ad-hoc arrangement under which 
attorneys from the bar were selected randomly and appointed to defend 
indigent defendants on an as-needed basis. Such a system not only 
generated discontent within the bar but also created potential conflicts of 
interest as attorneys, unskilled in the practice of criminal defense, were 
assigned to complex criminal cases with which they had little familiarity 
and even fewer resources to exploit. 
Foltz envisioned a public defender’s office consisting of a group of 
lawyers, exceptionally qualified and uniquely skilled in the practice of 
criminal law; these lawyers would have succinctly outlined job 
responsibilities in order to provide cost effective indigent defense 
services.
11
 Additionally, the lawyers who would comprise her proposed 
office would serve for a pre-defined term and, arguably most 
importantly, be public officers of the court.
12
 Moreover, Foltz’s vision 
and subsequent bill provided for the just compensation of the men and 
                                                                                                             
5 BARBARA BABCOCK, WOMAN LAWYER: THE TRIALS OF CLARA FOLTZ 2 (2011). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 3. 
8 Id. at 246. 
9 Id. at 289. 
10 See generally Sara Mayeux, The Case of the Black Gloved Rapist: Defining the 
Public Defender’s Role In California Courts, 1913-1948, 5 CAL. LEGAL. HIST. 217, 220 
(2010). 
11 Mortimer Schwartz, The Battles of Clara Shortridge Foltz, CALIFORNIA DEFENDER, 
Vol. 1, Issue 1 (Spring 1985). 
12 Id. 
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women who would make up the public defender’s office.13 Such an 
adequate system of compensation and service for a set period of time 
would hopefully, in large part, eradicate an issue that pervaded the 
former system which offered court appointed attorneys very little 
remuneration.
14
 
II. L.A. COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE: THE FRUIT OF 
FOLTZ’S LABOR 
In 1913, on the heels of Clara Foltz’s pioneering work in the field of 
indigent criminal justice, Los Angeles County opened the nation’s first 
public defender’s office.15 Relatedly, just two years prior, in 1911, Foltz 
also led a widespread women’s suffrage movement in California that 
ended with the passage of the state’s Women’s Vote Amendment.16 I 
maintain that the interplay between Foltz’s involvement in the women’s 
suffrage movement and her simultaneous visions of a California 
defender’s office was both significant and correlative. As a result of 
Foltz’s successful women’s suffrage movement, a broader and more 
diverse voting base emerged. The emergence of this new voting base was 
arguably the impetus for the passage of Foltz’s pioneering public 
defender legislation in California. 
Los Angeles County’s public defender’s office was significant in a 
number of ways. However, perhaps most noteworthy was the fact that 
the office opened its doors nearly a half-century before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.17 The office accepted its first 
case in January of 1914 with a staff that, at that time, consisted of only 
one managing attorney, four deputies, and an office secretary.
18
 Nearly 
one-hundred years later, in 2015, the Los Angeles public defender’s 
office employs more than 1,100 attorneys alone, not to mention hundreds 
of secretaries, paralegals, and administrative professionals.
19
 
In the progressive political climate of California, Foltz’s public 
defender’s office was graciously welcomed, and just seven years later in 
1921 the California Legislature codified their approval by passing a bill 
                                                                                                             
13 See generally id. 
14 Eric Siegrist, Criminal Justice and the Indigent Defendant, 2 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 
219, 220 (1991). 
15 Barbara Babcock, Inventing The Public Defender, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1267, 1274 
(2006). 
16 Schwartz, supra note 11. 
17 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336; Babcock, supra note 15, at 1274. 
18 Alan Simon, Honoring 100 Years of the Los Angeles Public Defender, THE LOS 
ANGELES LAWYER, Nov. 2013, at 68. 
19 Simon, supra note 18. 
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that significantly expanded funding for public defender’s offices to cover 
all California state courts.
20
 However, elsewhere in the United States, 
particularly in small cities and towns, the guarantee of the accused’s right 
to counsel was still very much elusive. In the infamous 1932 Supreme 
Court case of Powell v. Alabama (better known as the ―Scottsboro Boys‖ 
case) nine African-American youths were sentenced to death for the rape 
of two white women.
21
 While the Supreme Court reversed several of the 
convictions due to the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel, the Court’s 
decision as it pertained to the relevant Sixth Amendment analysis 
remained exceptionally narrow; the right to counsel only existed in state 
courts where the defendants were charged with capital crimes.
22
 
Additionally, ten years after Powell, in Betts v. Brady the Court 
narrowed its previous decision even further.
23
 Betts established that the 
Sixth Amendment only guaranteed a right to counsel in sufficiently 
unique circumstances where the defendant was either illiterate or 
mentally handicapped.
24
 While California bounded ahead with its 
dynamic and progressive form of indigent criminal justice, much of the 
country lagged behind. 
However, within the next decade, World War II would ravage the 
country’s conscience and leave behind widespread social and economic 
struggle.
25
 It was in this wake, and to a derivative extent, the wake of the 
simultaneous Civil Rights Movement, when the United States first began 
to truly realize the importance of government funded advocacy on behalf 
of indigent criminal defendants.
26
 
III. GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT AND THE PATH TO CONTEMPORARY 
DEFENDER’S OFFICES 
Scholars, historians, and law students alike have lauded the Supreme 
Court’s 1963 decision in Gideon v. Wainwright as a monumental 
breakthrough for the accused’s guarantee to a right to counsel. However, 
as will be discussed infra, the promises and guarantees that purportedly 
flow from the decision in Gideon have been largely unfulfilled. The facts 
surrounding Clarence Earl Gideon’s long saga with the law have been 
                                                                                                             
20 Marybeth Herald & Sandra Rierson, “I Mean To Succeed”: Clara Foltz and the 
Reinvention of Self, 53. AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 131, 137 (2013). 
21 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
22 Id. at 59. 
23 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
24 Betts, 316 U.S. at 465. 
25 Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. 
REV. 7, 21 (1994). 
26 Id. at 22. 
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permanently emblazoned in every first year Constitutional Law student’s 
mind. Nevertheless, given the gravity of the Court’s decision and the 
incredibly powerful impact it has had on contemporary criminal justice, 
its background is worth briefly reciting for the purposes of this note. 
In the early 1960s, Clarence Gideon, a man with an eighth grade 
education and a penchant for the commission of petty crimes was 
arrested for breaking and entering an unoccupied poolroom.
27
 At the 
outset of his criminal trial, Gideon appeared in front of a Florida circuit 
court judge and requested the appointment of an attorney.
28
 The judge 
denied the request, relying on the long-standing principle established by 
the United States Supreme Court in Betts v. Brady.
29
 With no other 
choices, Gideon represented himself throughout his trial.
30
 Only semi-
literate and unskilled in the nuances of the law, Gideon’s pro se 
representation was woefully inadequate.
31
 He was found guilty and 
sentenced to five years in a Florida penitentiary.
32
 
Once in prison, Gideon filed several petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus in the Florida Supreme Court.
33
 These writs challenged his 
conviction on the ground that the court’s refusal to appoint an attorney 
was in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.
34
 After unsuccessfully 
petitioning Florida’s highest court, Gideon successfully petitioned the 
United States Supreme Court.
35
 In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed 
to hear his case to decide the issue of whether an accused has a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel when in state court.
36
 In a unanimous 
opinion, the Court overruled its previous decision in Betts, and held that 
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a right to counsel is a fundamental 
right, extending to all states.
37
 
Justice Black, who unsurprisingly dissented in the Court’s earlier 
Betts opinion, authored the unanimous opinion in Gideon. Black 
famously proclaimed: ―reason and reflection require us to recognize that 
in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person who is hauled 
into court who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured of a fair 
trial unless counsel is provided for him.‖38 The Court’s decision in 
                                                                                                             
27 Gideon, 372 U.S. 335, 336 (1963). 
28 Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1963). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Gideon, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See generally, Gideon, 153 So. 2d 299 (1963). 
35 See generally, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 343. 
38 Id. at 344. 
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Gideon v. Wainwright ushered in a new era of progressivism in the arena 
of criminal justice that immediately impacted both federal and state 
courts across the country. However, Gideon was just merely the start of 
an uphill battle for equal rights in the justice system. 
IV. PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND THE PERCEPTION OF INFERIORITY 
Unfortunately, it should come as no surprise to anyone reasonably 
familiar with the contemporary legal job market in the United States that 
both prosecutors and public defenders are not afforded the same status as 
attorneys in other private or specialty areas.
39
 Moreover, both prosecutors 
and public defenders are generally compensated significantly less than 
their private sector equivalents.
40
 As a result, I submit that only a small 
percentage of the best and brightest law school graduates are attracted to 
public interest law—particularly positions within public defender offices, 
where there is the added and misguided stigma of defending potentially 
guilty criminals.
41
 While many young attorneys begin their careers in 
such offices, they frequently only stay long enough to gather the requisite 
experience to move on to a higher paying job—generally in the private 
sector.
42
 
This so-called escalator approach (or ―stepping stone‖ approach) to 
government work is crippling in a few ways. First, such a high turnover 
rate plagues the system which neither develops nor maintains a solid core 
of experienced attorneys who will represent the public defender’s office 
and provide a consistently high level of representation to indigent 
defendants. Relatedly, I submit that the idea of the public defender’s 
office as a ―stepping stone‖ also unfortunately stamps it with a stigma of 
unwarranted inferiority—a place where young, unseasoned attorneys pay 
their dues until a more lucrative, prestigious private sector job is made 
available to them. The rare exception is the individual who dedicates his 
or her life to working as a public defender. Particularly in the realm of 
criminal defense law, there is a distinctly bifurcated perception of the 
public defender compared to the private criminal defense attorney. The 
latter is seen as more competent, professional, and worthy of respect 
within the profession.
43
 As such, the former may be perceived by a 
layperson (such as an indigent defendant) as merely an ―entry level‖ or 
                                                                                                             
39 RONALD WALDRON ET AL., THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 252-53 (Ronald Waldron 
ed., 5th ed. 2009). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 STEVEN COX ET AL., JUVENILE JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO THEORY POLICY & PRACTICE 216 
(Jerry Westby et al. eds., 8th ed. 2013). 
43 WALDRON, supra note 39, at 252. 
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―junior‖ position—regardless of the relative skill or capability of the 
attorney. 
Is this perception of public defender inferiority wholly warranted? 
Consider the following excerpt from a nationwide survey of public 
defenders in the United States. An average of 40% of public defenders 
reported that they had received insufficient training for basic tasks such 
as interviewing clients, reviewing evidence, and negotiating with 
prosecutors [discussed further infra].
44
 Similar studies have found that, 
with very few exceptions, the level of competence of ―newly assigned‖ 
public defenders was ―much lower‖ than the applicable skill and 
knowledge requirements that are necessary for effective job 
performance.
45
 
In light of my proposed theory of the public defender’s office as a 
―stepping stone,‖ this study is even more troubling. That is to say, 
without an effective internal training mechanism within the defender’s 
office to increase the legal proficiency of young attorneys, the 
opportunity for an indigent defendant to receive constitutionally suitable 
legal representation is significantly hindered. To be successful, this 
internal training must necessarily be done by older, wiser, more skilled 
attorneys who have spent a significant portion of their career within the 
defender’s office and who understand the subtleties, not to mention the 
fundamentals, of effective public defender representation. A ―stepping 
stone‖ or ―escalator‖ approach to the public defender’s office only 
exacerbates the issue of inadequate on-the-job training, and thus, in the 
process, continues to perpetuate the social stigma associated with the 
office. 
Finally, the perception of public defender inferiority can also be 
addressed on a socio-psychological level. At its core, the services 
provided by the office of the public defender are a form of welfare. On 
this note, there exists a very American, capitalistic notion of ―you get 
what you pay for.‖46 Having a public defender appointed to you at no 
cost may create the unjustified expectation of failure from the 
perspective of the client. As a result, this expectation of failure, in turn, 
may generate a form of resentment towards the attorney.
47
 Moreover, the 
financial exchange that occurs between a client and a private attorney 
creates an improper presumption of legitimacy in and of itself—even if 
all other signs refute that presumption.
48
 Because there is no financial 
                                                                                                             
44 WALDRON, supra note 39, at 253. 
45 Id. 
46 See generally People v. Matney, 293 Ill. App. 3d. 139, 143 (1997). 
47 HOWARD ADABINSKY, LAW COURTS & JUSTICE IN AMERICA 231 (Waveland Press, 
Inc., 7th ed. 2014). 
48 See generally id. at 232. 
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exchange between an indigent defendant and his appointed public 
defender the unwarranted presumption of illegitimacy and, thus, 
inadequacy arises. 
Additionally, there exists a flawed notion that a paying client, more 
than the non-paying client, can better control the actions of his attorney, 
and as a result, can better control his or her destiny within the legal 
system.
49
 This is a particularly important dynamic to consider in light of 
the fact that the public defender is employed by the state, the same 
sovereign body that is attempting to convict the client.
50
 To an 
unsophisticated client, this unfortunate juxtaposition of the lawyer who is 
purportedly there to help him, and the sovereign that is attempting to 
convict him, may create the perception of a conflict of interest.
51
 
V. THE ENORMOUS DISCRETIONARY POWER OF THE 
PROSECUTOR 
Making matters worse for the perceived inferiority of the public 
defender is the unparalleled discretionary power given to prosecutors. 
Aside from the judge, the prosecutor is arguably the single most 
powerful actor in the criminal justice system.
52
 Two of the most essential 
pre-trial junctures of any criminal case are the initial decision to charge 
and the decision whether to extend a plea bargain.
53
 The prosecutor, not 
the public defender, nearly exclusively dictates these two domains.
54
 
On a more microscopic level, one can appreciate just how much 
latitude this gives the prosecutor. For example, within his or her 
exclusive decision to charge, the prosecutor also holds the decision as to 
what crime to charge. That is, if Defendant X is arrested for possession 
of a half-pound of marijuana, the prosecutor may often have the 
extraordinarily wide latitude to charge Defendant X with either simple 
possession (a misdemeanor in most jurisdictions) or alternatively, 
possession of a half-pound of marijuana with intent to sell (a felony in 
most jurisdictions). Conversely, the prosecutor may have the discretion 
to not charge Defendant X at all.
55
 
                                                                                                             
49 John Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1284 
(1994). 
50 ADABINSKY, supra note 47. 
51 Id. 
52 See generally Angela Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The 
Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 202 (2007). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See generally Bennett Gershman, Prosecutorial Decision Making and Discretion in 
the Charging Function, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 1259, 1269 (2011). 
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The decision to charge and the decision to offer a plea are also 
intricately intertwined in the already tenuously structured power 
relationship between the prosecutor and the public defender. Similar to 
how the prosecutor has great discretionary power within his or her 
already exclusive domain in the decision to charge, so too does that 
power exist on a more molecular level within the context of plea-
bargaining.
56
 We return once again to our hypothetical Defendant X. Just 
as Defendant X and his public defender were in a negatively leveraged 
position with regard to the prosecutor’s decision to charge, a very similar 
and equally negatively leveraged situation may arise within the context 
of plea-bargaining. For instance, if in the search incident to Defendant 
X’s marijuana arrest police had also found an unregistered handgun, the 
defendant would almost certainly face additional charges. A strategic 
prosecutor may condition a more generous plea bargain as to one offense 
in exchange for pleading guilty to the other alleged offense. With the 
looming risk of trial, many defendants will accept plea bargains, even if 
such a deal is not in their best interests.
57
 
As should be readily apparent, the prosecutor, not the public 
defender, holds the vast majority of the leverage in these pre-trial 
negotiations. This issue is only worsened when the public defender, who 
is purportedly representing the indigent defendant’s interests, is a young 
and severely undertrained attorney (discussed supra). Additionally, as 
will be discussed further, infra, the decision to accept potentially 
unfavorable plea bargains is further complicated by the grossly excessive 
caseloads faced by public defenders across the United States. 
VI. PUBLIC FUNDING: PROSECUTORS VS. PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
Public defender offices often receive their operating funding from 
one of two potential sources: state funds or county funds.
58
 Sometimes 
this funding is received from a combination of both sources.
59
 New York, 
for example, is one of the few states that operate within a predominantly 
county-funded public defender system.
60
 On average, New York counties 
                                                                                                             
56 Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining In the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 
1471, 1475 (1993). 
57 See Gershman, supra note 55. 
58 See generally Mollie Eadie, Disparity In Financial Resources Between Defense, 
Prosecution Leads to Unfair Results, THE SARATOGIAN NEWS (Sept. 18, 2014) 
http://www.saratogian.com/ general-news/20140918/disparity-in-financial-resources-bet
ween-defense-prosecution-leads-to-unfair-unjust-results. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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receive only 17% of their funding from the state.
61
 Due to the varying 
commitment to public defender funding throughout counties in New 
York and other states with similar funding structures, the quality of legal 
representation in one county may be drastically lower than in another. An 
indigent defendant arrested in County A may receive competent 
representation, while another indigent defendant arrested in neighboring 
County B may receive grossly inadequate representation due to a lack of 
funding, excessive caseloads, or a myriad of other reasons – some of 
which will be discussed infra. The lack of uniformity of funding and 
access to resources within the public defender system creates impossibly 
complex legal and social ramifications for indigent defendants.
62
 
Making matters worse is the fact that state and local governments 
commonly spend nearly three times as much on prosecution funding than 
on applicable public defender funding.
63
 In the frequent cases where no 
public defender is available, states assign private attorneys who are 
compensated at hourly rates significantly lower than what is common in 
traditional attorney-client fee agreements.
64
 These low rates, often 
topping out at around $65 an hour, barely begin to cover the costs 
associated with a private attorney’s administrative fees in handling a 
case, such as copying costs, records requests, and legal research.
65
 Such a 
system represents an unfortunate regression to the ad-hoc policies of the 
Pre-Foltzian public defender era. Moreover, at such low rates, the 
average attorney cannot afford to spend significant time analyzing the 
interstices of the relevant issues and developing effective legal 
defenses.
66
 
The allocation, or lack thereof, of tax dollars for public defenders 
represents a larger, more systemic issue than what first meets the eye. In 
2007, state prosecutor’s offices countrywide outspent their public 
defender counterparts by more than $3.5 billion dollars.
67
 In California, 
the progressive bastion that once championed indigent defendants’ 
rights, prosecution spending is outpacing the equivalent defense funding 
                                                                                                             
61 Id. 
62 An Argument for an Independent Federal Defender System to Guarantee the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel, NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION (Aug. 
1, 2013). 
63 Five Problems Facing Public Defense on the 40th Anniversary of Gideon v. 
Wainwright, NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, http://www.nlada.org/ 
Defender/Defender_Gideon/Defender_Gideon_5_problems. 
64 Levintova, et. al., Why You’re In Deep Trouble If You Can’t Afford A Lawyer, 
MOTHERJONES (Jul. 1, 2013) http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/public-defen
ders-gideon-supreme-court-charts. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Levintova, supra note 64. 
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to a tune of $300 million dollars.
68
 This trend also continued on a 
nationwide scale in 2008, with prosecution and corrections spending 
outpacing public defense spending at a rate of 14 to 1.
69
 The following 
charts are illustrative of the dire straits of public defender funding: 
70
 
 
71
 
                                                                                                             
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70  Levintova, supra note 64 (reproduced from website); Justice Policy Institute.  
2015] THE PUBLIC DEFENDER CRISIS IN AMERICA 179 
 
VII. THE UNITED STATES’ PUNITIVE POLICY & THE WAR ON 
DRUGS 
I maintain that a large part of what plagues public defender offices 
today is the United States’ punitive policy vis-à-vis the War on Drugs. 
The United States is home to a $50 billion dollar a year illegal drug 
industry.
72
 This industry is primarily domestic and thus, those who are 
ensnared by the War on Drugs are subject to an already taxed American 
judicial system.
73
 In 1988, widely considered to be the beginning of the 
―zero tolerance‖ drug movement, there were over 1 million drug related 
arrests in the United States.
74
 Naturally, this number has only risen since 
then. Moreover, within the last decade, the United States has surpassed 
Russia to become the nation with the largest percentage of its population 
in jails or prisons.
75
 This fact is staggering, considering that America’s 
War on Drugs has only become a larger and more expensive proposition 
over time.
76
 
The rise of the War on Drugs in the 1980’s and 1990’s was fueled in 
part by the idea that America’s moral fabric was deteriorating.77 Rising 
levels of drug crime allegedly evidenced this fact.
78
 As a result, 
legislators on both the federal and state levels enacted ―zero tolerance‖ 
policies aimed at drug offenders.
79
 The trickle-down effect of the War on 
Drugs eventually came to rest at the doors of public defenders offices 
across the country. As state governments ramped up spending on 
policing and prosecuting crime, the natural back-end effect was to 
decrease fiscal support to indigent defender services. In New York, for 
example, the Legal Aid Society represented 200,000 indigent defendants 
in the 1995 calendar year.
80
 Just four years later, in 1999, they 
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represented the same number of indigent defendants, but with $20 
million dollars less in funding.
81
 This meant fewer attorneys, fewer 
investigators, fewer social workers, fewer administrative staff members, 
less pay for the remaining Legal Aid workers, and unfathomably large 
caseloads. 
To further put the current indigent defender crisis in perspective, 
consider that in 2010 there were over 7.1 million people imprisoned in 
the United States, mostly for drug offenses.
82
 By contrast, in 1964, 
shortly after the Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright there 
were only 200,000 people in state and federal prisons.
83
 It is exceedingly 
obvious that this trend should not, and cannot, continue at its current 
pace if the United States wants to seriously commit itself to upholding its 
constitutional guarantees by providing effective indigent representation. 
Brooklyn, New York has pioneered progressive indigent defender 
treatment. Specifically, Brooklyn offers a potentially much less punitive 
approach to habitual drug offenders with the creation of the Brooklyn 
Treatment Court.
84
 Defendants who have been arrested for felony or 
misdemeanor charges where drug addiction is a component of their 
offense may be eligible for the drug treatment diversion program.
85
 
Successful completion of the drug treatment program may result in a 
defendant’s charges being reduced or even dismissed.86 Such a 
therapeutic approach, and not the status quo of punitive drug crime 
policy, seems almost counter intuitive in our contemporary ―tough on 
drugs‖ political climate. Moreover, clients who are diverted into the drug 
treatment program and are later re-arrested are nevertheless given 
multiple attempts to re-enter treatment and complete it successfully.
87
 
Such an approach embraces the model of drug addiction as an ongoing 
disease, instead of a sign of transient misbehavior. 
While the increased usage of drug courts in the United States as a 
therapeutic tool would certainly help curb stress on the system by cutting 
                                                                                                             
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/ 09/ nyregion/for-the-poor-a-lawyer-with-1600-clients.
html. 
81 Id. 
82 Prison Population Declined For First Time In Four Decades, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS (Dec. 15, 2011) http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/p10cpus10pr.cfm. 
83 Robin Steinberg, Heading Gideon’s Call in Twenty-First Century: Holistic Defense 
and the New Public Defense Paradigm, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 961, 966 (2013). 
84 Chuck Gomez, Brooklyn Treatment Court: A Second Chance For Drug Offenders, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 22, 2013) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chuck-gomez/brookly
n-treatment-court_b_3053615.html. 
85 Drug Treatment Courts, NY STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, https://www.nycourts.g
ov/courts/problem_solving/drugcourts/overview.shtml. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
2015] THE PUBLIC DEFENDER CRISIS IN AMERICA 181 
 
down on excessive adversarial work for public defenders, it does not do 
much to immediately ameliorate heavy caseloads. Additionally, drug 
courts only aim to cover individuals who are deemed ―treatable.‖88 That 
is, an indigent defendant who is arrested for a drug offense may not 
qualify for diversion treatment if he or she is deemed to be in the 
business of transporting or selling narcotics but is not truly ―addicted‖ in 
a traditional medical sense. In this regard, the ongoing War on Drugs and 
the stress that it creates within public defender’s offices still remains an 
issue. Nevertheless, drug courts represent an empirical example of how 
therapeutic forms of treatment, at a systemic level, can potentially help 
cut down on the ever-growing prison population in the United States. As 
a result, I maintain that such an effect will, at least in the long term, 
necessarily reduce public defender caseloads as more indigent defenders 
are funneled into therapeutic, non-adversarial, pre-trial diversion 
programs. 
Relatedly, the American Council of Chief Defenders, in conjunction 
with a U.S. Department of Defense survey, recommend that public 
defender caseloads should not exceed pre-determined levels of: 150 
felonies, 400 non-traffic misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, 200 Mental 
Health Act cases, or 25 non-capital appeals per attorney, per year.
89
 
Excessive caseloads can affect the performance of even the most skilled 
attorneys. Young, inexperienced public defenders are even more 
susceptible to the adverse effects of overly burdensome caseloads. 
Without the proper attention to detail—which often includes a significant 
number of hours to perform legal and investigatory research—an 
indigent defendant may unjustifiably languish in jail. Effectively 
regulating public defender caseloads is a simple safeguard against such 
blatant injustices. Unfortunately, due in large part to the War on Drugs, 
defender caseloads are much higher than the figures cited in the 
recommended guidelines.
90
 
One of the most damning indictments of the broken indigent defense 
system in the United States is the recent Florida Supreme Court decision 
of In Re Public Defender of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit.
91
 In a 5 to 2 
decision, the Court held that Miami-Dade County public defenders could 
withdraw from felony cases due to their excessive workloads, which 
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hindered the effective representation of their clients.
92
 In many instances, 
Miami-Dade public defenders had as many as 50 cases set for trial a 
week.
93
 Such an exorbitant number of cases left helpless attorneys 
absolutely no room for effective representation, even on a marginal level. 
The Court found that overloaded defenders were unable to interview 
clients, conduct investigations, take depositions, prepare mitigation, or 
counsel clients about pleas offered at arraignment.
94
 The challenge 
becomes even more insurmountable when one considers the amazing 
disparity of resources between the public defender and the prosecutor (as 
discussed infra). 
As a corollary to this issue, the American Bar Association’s Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct highlights the minimum thresholds for 
attorney standards. ABA Rule 1.1 mandates a lawyer’s required level of 
competence: ―[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a 
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.‖95 An alarming reality is that public defenders in many 
high-volume cities cannot live up to their minimum competence 
requirements, as stipulated by the American Bar Association, as well as 
the bars of their respective states. What then is the solution to this ever-
growing issue? 
VIII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
One of the most obvious, yet elusive, solutions to help cure the 
problem of public defender versus prosecutor disparity is to equalize pay 
in all jurisdictions across the country. A decision to uniformly increase 
public defender salaries in order to better align with their adversarial 
counterparts would go a long way in helping the current crisis. First, 
increased salaries would help attract more qualified law school graduates 
to public defender offices. Secondly, increased salaries would not only 
boost short-term morale but also contribute greatly towards the retention 
of experienced attorneys who would have otherwise been more inclined 
to venture elsewhere in search of higher pay after only short public 
defender’s office tenures. As a result, any talent gap between the public 
defender and the equivalently situated prosecutor would necessarily 
begin to close. 
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To illustrate the feasibility of such a scenario, consider a somewhat 
recent initiative in Albemarle County, Virginia—home of Charlottesville 
and the University of Virginia. Until recently, an experienced prosecutor 
in Albemarle County was paid an annual salary of $97,404.
96
 An 
equivalently experienced Public Defender was paid $66,327.
97
 Now, 
however, the county has committed an amount of local tax revenue to 
supplement public defender pay. Albemarle County is just the second of 
25 offices in Virginia to boost public defender salaries through local tax 
initiatives.
98
 While Albemarle County represents just the enlightened 
minority of districts that realize the vital contributions of public 
defenders that warrant equal pay, it is a positive sign for future change. If 
relatively small to modestly sized counties are able to successfully pass 
tax initiatives dedicating more funds to equal financial treatment, 
certainly this trend should be sustainable elsewhere in the United States. 
Additionally, I would propose that state and local governments that 
are unable to pass such tax initiatives for increased salaries instead offer 
partial student loan forgiveness for newly hired public defenders. As 
discussed infra, taking a job at the public defender’s office is often a 
daunting prospect for newly barred attorneys. With mounting student 
debt, potential societal stigma, and negligible starting salaries with only 
pre-determined room for salary increases, many law school graduates are 
understandably disenchanted by the idea of committing to the public 
defender’s office. 
However, just as Albemarle County was able to pass tax initiatives 
for raising salaries, so can state and local governments for the purpose of 
funding debt forgiveness programs for young attorneys—namely public 
defenders in high-need jurisdictions. Such an inducement may be highly 
attractive to skilled young attorneys looking to gain invaluable 
experience litigating cases right out of law school. A more generously 
structured federal loan forgiveness program, targeted specifically toward 
public defenders could potentially increase both the size and quality of 
the public defender applicant pool.
99
 In return for full of partial student 
loan relief, lawyers would commit a significant tenure of years to the 
office in an attempt to curb the ―stepping stone‖ approach. While some 
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may argue that the difference between this and a true salary increase is 
imperceptible, it is important to note that such a program offers its own 
basis of merit by not upsetting the delicate bureaucratic policies that 
often control government salaries. Such a loan forgiveness initiative can 
potentially be introduced under a less controversial back-door public 
policy rationale, rather than a bona-fide, across the board salary increase. 
Aside from tinkering with the financial incentives at play, there are 
more fundamental solutions to relieve the crisis faced by public 
defenders. Cutting back on, or the outright decriminalization of, many 
misdemeanor drug crimes would help tremendously. Additionally, a less 
punitive approach to many other kinds of misdemeanors would 
significantly alleviate stress on the system. A recent study by the Vera 
Institute of Justice, entitled ―Incarceration’s Front Door: The Misuse of 
Jails in America‖ found that the majority of individuals who make up the 
United States jail and prison population are incarcerated for minor 
violations.
100
 These infractions include such petty offenses as evading 
subway fees, minor drug possession, and driving with suspended 
licenses.
101
 
The Institute of Justice’s study found that while violent crime has 
fallen by nearly 50% since 1983, and property crime has fallen more than 
40%, more people than ever are in jail on any given day in the United 
States.
102
 With many Americans still reeling from the recent recession, 
crimes normally punished by a small fine are unable to be paid, which 
results in jail time for many. This unfortunate fact coincides neatly with 
the increasingly punitive nature of the American justice system.
103
 Judges 
are less likely, in many instances, to grant bail amidst a culture of 
statutorily created zero tolerance policies and mandatory minimum 
sentencing guidelines.
104
 Thus, naturally, as discussed supra, prosecutors 
are more likely to bring charges or to refuse to negotiate for fair plea 
bargains. As a result, the public defender is entangled in between the 
two, often in a lose-lose situation. A commitment by state legislatures to 
scale back on zero-tolerance drug crimes, or moreover abolish 
―mandatory minimum‖ sentences for first-time non-violent offenders in 
non-drug offenses, would significantly reduce the burden on public 
defenders. 
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IX. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Considering that the United States’ legal system is derived from 
England’s longstanding common law history, it is surprising how the two 
countries diverge when it comes to indigent defense practices. Unlike in 
the United States, funding for indigent defense in England comes 
exclusively from the central government.
105
 Similarly, while judge-made 
law has been the vehicle serving as the impetus for indigent defense 
rights in the United States, England has tightly circumscribed 
Parliamentary legislation that covers this right.
106
 
In 1903, England passed the ―Poor Prisoners’ Defense Act‖ with the 
aim to assist individuals who could not afford representation in 
England’s Magistrates’ Courts.107 The Act was successfully backed with 
an incredible amount of government funding, second in contribution only 
to England’s national healthcare fund.108 Throughout the next century, 
however, the number of criminal cases began increasing and stress on the 
English indigent defense system began mounting – much like it did 
during the United States’ ―War on Drugs‖ period, which started in the 
1980s.
109
 However, unlike the United States, which cut funding to 
defense programs during this period, England increased its central 
funding of indigent defense programs.
110
 In the 1980s, multiple programs 
were introduced to alleviate the stress on the existing defender system.
111
 
These programs, funded by the national government, assured that all 
defendants in Magistrates’ Courts were given readily accessible legal 
representation through ―duty solicitors.‖112 Current spending on legal aid 
in the United Kingdom is over 2.6 billion pounds (over $3.8 billion).
113
 
More recently, in 1999, Parliament passed the ―Access to Justice 
Act‖ which obviated the need for the pre-existing ―means test‖ 
requirement in order to receive defense assistance.
114
 As a result, very 
few individuals, rich or poor, retain private attorneys for criminal 
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matters.
115
 The extremely high quality of public defense legal work as 
well as ample public funding helps make defendants’ choices easy.116 
This operates in stark contrast to the United States’ system. In fact, 
evidence shows that after the passage of the Access to Justice Act, more 
English citizens retained private physicians (in lieu of England’s 
National Healthcare) than defendants retained private attorneys.
117
 
As a by-product of this insight into England’s public defender 
system, it is also worthwhile to note that the United Kingdom has a much 
more progressive attitude regarding most illegal drugs than the United 
States. For example, in 2001, England’s Labour Government reclassified 
cannabis/marijuana as a ―Class C‖ drug, which removed the threat of 
arrest and prosecution for being in possession of the drug.
118
 To put this 
in perspective: in 2012, police officers in the United States made 1 
marijuana/cannabis arrest every 42 seconds.
119
 This figure is staggering, 
and demonstrates just how much of a burden a punitive drug policy is on 
the judicial and public defense system. Moreover, of all drug arrests in 
the United States in 2011, more than 50% were for 
marijuana/cannabis.
120
 If the United States takes a strong stance 
regarding the re-classification of marijuana’s illegal status, an enormous 
burden would be alleviated from the system, even without any other 
changes to the public defender funding structure. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The United States has changed immensely since the work of Clara 
Foltz in the late 1800’s and the subsequent Supreme Court decision of 
Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963. Unfortunately, this change has often been 
regressive, leaving the promises of Gideon and the visions of Foltz 
largely unfulfilled. As discussed supra, public defender offices 
nationwide are more overworked, underpaid, and underprepared today 
than they have ever been in our nation’s history. Moreover, zero 
tolerance laws and ―mandatory minimum‖ sentencing structures are only 
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exacerbating the existing crisis. If the United States aims to live up to its 
own constitutional guarantees of indigent criminal representation, it must 
devote more resources to public defender offices—including significant 
state and federal funding to combat the growing numbers of defendants 
who are in need of representation. Conversely, if the United States is not 
able, or is not willing, to commit more funding to this cause, it is 
imperative to take a more progressive stance on prosecuting victimless 
crimes, such as minor drug infractions. Doing this will, at least in part, 
alleviate the tremendous stress on the indigent defense system and enable 
public defender offices across the country to better provide the accused 
with their constitutional guarantees to effective representation and a fair 
trial. 
